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MONITORING CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
INTRODUCTION

This Article identifies the fundamental tradeoff faced by individuals, firms and institutions that monitor corporate management's performance. This tradeoff, between objectivity in monitoring and
proximity in monitoring, is central to the corporate governance debate.
Proximity exists when monitors maintain close contact with management and participate in important decisions on a real-time basis. Objectivity exists when monitors, such as hostile acquirers, analysts, credit
rating agencies, accounting firms, and outside lenders, remain distant
from management and evaluate management's performance without
influence by management.
A tradeoff between monitoring functions exists because monitors
that obtain close proximity necessarily forego objectivity, and objective monitors must maintain sufficient distance from management,
which results in loss of the advantages of proximity. Thus, each individual firm's monitor must choose his or her preferred characteristic;
proximity and objectivity cannot coexist. Although, theoretically, a
firm could have both proximate and objective monitors, most countries' corporate governance laws encourage only one monitoring function, thus rendering such "mixed monitoring" somewhat unlikely.
Where neither proximity nor objectivity exists, it would appear
that effective monitoring and discipline of management also cannot
exist. In such a situation outside investors are reluctant to invest, so
firms must turn to internal sources of finance. We observe, however,
that certain corporate governance systems feature neither objectivity
nor proximity. For example, we find one such system in Italy. The
Italian system, which protects workers who invest in firm specific assets, ably contracts around the structural flaws in its corporate governance systems.' In Italy, the proliferation of smaller, owner-managed
firms helps avoid corporate governance failure. 2
This Article argues that, notwithstanding current legal constraints
on nonuniform systems of corporate governance within particular nations, firms would benefit from deciding between and adapting to objectivity and proximity on an industry-wide rather than a nation-wide
level.
Monitors are crucial to effective corporate governance and assume a variety of forms: directors, auditors, credit rating agencies,
stock market analysts, takeover firms, arbitrageurs, large shareholders,
and outside lenders. Even customers and suppliers act as monitors
when they exercise their ability to observe management quality and to
I
For an overview of the Italian corporate governance system, see generally Jonathan
R. Macey, Italian Corporate Governance: One American's Perspective, 1998 COLUM. Bus. L. Rv.
121.
2 See id. at 141-43.
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send effective signals to the market about management's performance. This Article identifies a tradeoff which is fundamentally important to the corporate governance 'debate, that we must face when
evaluating a monitor's ability to succeed in improving a corporate governance system. This is the objectivity-proximity tradeoff. The authors
posit a corporate governance model, in which proximity and objectivity trade off. Each monitor within a corporate governance system
must choose a role that features one of these characteristics or the
other; a monitor cannot exhibit both proximity and objectivity. Theoretically, within a particular nation's system of corporate governance,
a firm could have proximate and objective monitors operating simultaneously. However, in the interest of predictability and ease of application, many nations create and maintain corporate governance laws
that facilitate uniform monitoring practices and discourage what we
term "mixed monitoring." Therefore, either proximity or objectivity
will necessarily dominate throughout successful corporate governance
systems.
Nonetheless, certain corporate governance systems feature neither
attribute and manage to succeed. Where neither proximity nor objectivity permits effective monitoring and management discipline, investors will still, albeit reluctantly, invest, and firms will turn to internal
sources of finance. Although such a system has obvious costs, it also
holds hidden virtues. For example, this type of system provides managers with strong incentives to make firm-specific human capital investments, which are necessary to develop specialized skills. Again,
3
Italy's system provides apt illustration.
The central argument of this Article is that the tradeoffs between
proximity and objectivity are ideally applied on an industry-specific
level rather than on a nation-wide level. Notwithstanding the legal
constraints that currently impede nonuniformity within particular
countries, and the fact that some countries have found success with
corporate governance that feature neither objectivity nor proximity,
data discussed in this Article supports this argument.
In Germany and the Netherlands, large shareholders or autonomous, entrenched boards of directors (supervisory boards) monitor
management intimately and intensively. 4 These directors enjoy close
proximity to the firms they monitor, participate in firm decisionmakSee id. at 142.
See Edward S. Adams, Corporate Governance After Enron and Global Crossing: Comparative Lessons for Cross-NationalImprovement, 78 IND. L.J. 723, 762 (2003); David Fairlamb &
Kerry Capell, The Netherlands: A Bog for Investors, Bus. WK., May 19, 2003, at 54; see also BoB
3
4

CHIRINKO ET AL., FIRM PERFORMANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN THE NETHERLANDS

5-11 (Univ. of Munich Ctr. for Econ. Studies & IFO Inst. for Econ.

Research, Working Paper No. 210, 1999), http://www.cesifo.de/pls/cesifo-app/CESifo
FrameSet.SwitchFrame?factor=10&page=/Iink/cesifo-wps.htm.
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ing, and monitor management's actions on a real-time basis.5 This
proximity inevitably results in these monitors becoming insiders, and
subject to capture by the firms they monitor. Their participation in
the decisionmaking process not only requires them to have faster access to information than takeover artists, arbitrageurs, credit rating
agencies, and analysts have, but it also establishes the conditions by
which incumbent management's capture of the monitors is most
likely to occur.6 Capture means that the block shareholder or bank
board member-the ostensible monitor-adopts the perspective of
the management team under supervision. When this occurs, outside
investor monitors may gradually lose their ability to evaluate a firm's
performance objectively, thereby offsetting the informational advantage that insiders enjoy in certain corporate governance systems.
In a corporate governance system such as the one in the United
States, directors, large shareholders, or others in close proximity to
7
the firm's managers, play a lesser role in monitoring management.
Instead, a variety of outside forces and institutions, particularly the
market for corporate control, credit rating agencies, leveraged
buyouts, and investment banking analysts, act as a-substitute for direct
shareholder involvement. 8 In this type of system, a considerable distance separates monitors (investors) and management. Thus, proximity is impossible, and investors face significant difficulty with respect to
obtaining timely, reliable information about management.
This information shortage could, in theory, reduce the effectiveness of corporate governance systems in which monitors lack close
proximity to management. For example, the effectiveness of the U.S.
system might be affected by the fact that monitoring in the United
States generally occurs ex post, rather than ex ante. It is, therefore,
evaluative, not proactive. However, this lack of proximity may also be
beneficial. In the United States, the distance between investors and
firms provides the objectivity lacking in corporate governance systems
in which more proximate monitoring subjects the monitors to the risk
of capture. Objectivity increases the probability that the monitors will
impose sanctions on corrupt or under-performing managers.

5
6

See Adams, supra note 4, at 762.
See id. at 762-63; see also Benjamin E. Hermalin &.Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of

Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature,FED. RES.
BOARD N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV., Apr. 2003, at 7, 7.
7
See Adams, supra note 4, at 729-32.
8
See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient CapitalMarkets, CorporateDisclosure, and Enron, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 394, 403-07 (2004) (discussing the market for corporate control, credit
rating agencies, and analysts' role in corporate governance); Bengt H61mstrom & Steven
N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong?, 15J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 11 (2003) (discussing takeovers, junk bonds, and particularly LBOs).
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Three important points about the objectivity-proximity tradeoff
must be considered in order to understand the argument presented
below. First, effective monitoring of corporate management cannot
exist unless the monitors possess the characteristics of either proximity
or objectivity. Second, there is a tradeoff between proximity and objectivity that makes it impossible for a particular monitor within a corporate governance system to provide both proximate and objective
monitoring. Third, corporate governance systems lacking one or
both of these characteristics can nonetheless succeed by adapting to
compensate for weaknesses in monitoring capability. These pathological corporate governance systems simply must adapt to survive.
Sometimes these adaptations, which generally involve turning to internal sources of finance, have benefits, such as encouraging firm and
asset-specific capital investments, that are not obvious at first glance.
Section I of this Article develops a theoretical framework that
highlights the source of the corporate governance problem, the objectives of corporate governance, and the importance of shareholders in
corporate governance. Section II suggests that systems differ in the
proximity and objectivity of supervision and control and that the optimal distance between management and monitor will be one of two
extremes: either monitors should capitalize on the increased access to
information that comes with proximity, or systems should seek optimal
benefit from the objectivity that accompanies distance. Section III
presents the issue of adaptability through review of American and continental European corporate governance arrangements and then we
consider the rather special case of Italy. The basic point in this section is Coasean in nature: firms in every country face legal constraints
around which they must bargain in order to obtain corporate governance regimes that meet their own, particularized contracting
requirements.9
Conclusions reached below about the nature of alternative corporate governance systems show the futility of efforts to design a perfect
corporate governance system. The following analysis reveals that no
clear answer exists to the question of which corporate governance system is best. However, the analysis does point to the desirability of
industry-tailored corporate governance arrangements.

9 This Article will not consider the impact of internal governance and product market competition on managerial agency problems. For a discussion of these issues, see
Shinichi Hirota & Kohei Kawamura, What Makes Autonomous ManagementDo Well? Corporate
Governance Without External Controls, in ECGI WORKING PAPER SERIES IN FINANCE (European
Corp. Governance Inst. No. W 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstractid=379100.
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I
CORPORATE GovERNANCE: THEORETICAL INSIGHTS

A.

The Corporate Governance Setting

On a theoretical level, the problems of corporate governance result from the existence of incomplete contracts. Therefore, it is desirable for governance to resolve the gaps left in these contracts in a
manner consistent with maximizing the value of the firm. In an important contribution to the analysis of this issue, Sanford Grossman
and Oliver Hart introduced the notion of residual rights of control,
which stresses the importance of allocating decisional power (control)
when unspecified contingencies arise. 10 Grossman and Hart narrowly
define corporate governance as the "complex set of constraints that
shape the [ex post] bargaining over the quasi-rents generated [by a
firm]. '"1 1 As such, corporate governance fills in any holes left in in-

complete contracts, but remains irrelevant for complete contracts.
Complete contracts would fully specify the desired course of action,
and provided that enforcement and time-inconsistency problems are
not at issue (and they are not in a world of complete contracting),
would leave no role for corporate governance.
The ability to exercise discretion with respect to incomplete contracts makes the allocation of residual rights of control important. In
the incomplete contract context, management may have a substantial
informational advantage that allows for certain residual rights of control. Therefore, more effective monitoring is necessary to level the
playing field between investors and managers. Management accountability vis-a-vis stakeholders, and the governance or supervision provided by those stakeholders, is the primary focus here.
Ideally, who should be granted the residual rights of control?
Shareholders lack protection in terms of enforceable contractual
rights-they have no legal rights to dividends, capital appreciation, or
even a return on their initial investments.1 2 Dividends are paid at the
discretion of a corporation's board of directors. Although dividends
may not be withheld in bad faith, directors have wide discretion in
determining how a corporation's free cash flow should be allocated,
and can decide that the corporation is best served by reinvesting such
10 See Sanford Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory
of Vertical and LateralIntegration,J. POL. ECON. 691, 692 (1986).
11

Luigi Zingales, Corporate Governance, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOM-

ICS AND THE LAW 497 (Peter Newman ed., 1997).

12 It is not feasible for shareholders to solve the agency problems between themselves
and managers through the contracting process, because such contracts would have to be
extremely elaborate. Fiduciary duties substitute for enforceable contract terms as a means
for protecting managers. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FIsCREL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 92 (1991).
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funds in internal corporate projects, rather than by paying them out
in the forms of dividends. 13 These factors suggest that shareholders
14
are the prime candidates for increased control rights.
This raises a difficult question: how should the corporate governance system be arranged to best protect shareholder interests? The
basic tradeoff between proximity and objectivity exists regardless of
whether the monitors act on behalf of residual claimants or some
other, more complex constellation of constituents. It is difficult for
shareholders to observe and evaluate monitors' performance, particularly when the monitors are involved in complex tasks on behalf of a
wide array of constituents with potentially conflicting objectives.
B.

Managerial Inefficiencies and Shareholder Involvement

The contracting problems that lie at the heart of corporate governance arise only when ownership is separate from control. When
management is made up of shareholders, shareholders automatically
possess control rights. But the exercise of these control rights is somewhat illusory, as they depend on annual meetings and other formal
events. In fact, both law and custom severely limit direct shareholder
involvement in corporate affairs.
These limitations become apparent when shareholders seek to
exercise direct control over managers. The potentially insurmountable free-rider problems that result from the dispersion of ownership
make this very difficult for shareholders. 1 5 Although the presence of
some large shareholders may ameliorate the freerider problem,' 6 the
participation of large shareholders in management leads to other difficulties. Large shareholders may face conflicts of interest that undermine their incentives to maximize firm value.' 7 For example, they
Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S. 2d 692 (1947).
See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 1998 Q. J.
ECON. 387, 423-25. Rajan and Zingales discuss the question of whether stakeholdersemployees, suppliers, or financers that make firm-specific investments-should have property rights in the firm. They suggest that stakeholders might actually have more incentive
to invest if they are insecure investors. Conversely, shareholders are better able to "make
decisions that are in the best interests of the firm," and thus could be a more effective
choice for increased control rights. Id. at 424. Further, highly firm-specific contributions
may limit ex post bargaining power. Shareholders, however, could part with their money,
and thus partially distance themselves from the direct decisionmaking, but receive control
rights ex post. The suppliers of other inputs, including workers (labor), generally cannot
distance themselves; they have a permanent effect on the quality and usage of their input.
Therefore, granting them control rights might be suboptimal. Id. at 423-25.
15
See Grossman & Hart, supra note 10, at 716-18.
16 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and CorporateControl, 94J.
POL. ECON. 461, 461-65 (1986).
17 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in CorporateGovernance Reconsidered,93 COLUM. L. REv. 795, 799-839 (1993) (discussing public pension fund conflicts of
interest).
13
14
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may enjoy private control benefits that distort decisionmaking. Alternatively, large shareholders such as public pension funds may be part
of organizations that face their own governance problems.' 8
In the United States, share ownership dispersion mitigates direct
shareholder involvement in corporate governance. This dispersion
limits direct shareholder involvement to periodic interference via
proxy fights, hostile takeovers, and other mechanisms of shareholder
mobilization. 19

In continental Europe, concentrated ownership prevails. However, this does not readily translate into increased shareholder control. In Germany, Korea, and Italy, for example, cross holdings and
pyramid structures shield firms from shareholder control. 20 Also,
nonexecutive directors (or supervisory boards in a two-tier system)
may shield management from direct shareholder involvement. 2 1 This
is particularly true in some continental European countries, such as
the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, Germany, where autonomous
supervisory boards operate semiindependently from shareholders and
22
effectively shield management from direct shareholder involvement.
See id. at 796-99.
19 In general, shareholders have stronger incentives to become involved when financial difficulties or managerial control problems emerge.
20
See generally Mark L. Loewenstein, Stakeholder Protection in Germany and Japan, 76
TUL. L. REV. 1673, 1675-83 (2002) (discussing the structure of corporate governance in
Germany); Robert Monks, Address at the Japan Investor Relations Association (Nov. 2,
1994), http://www.lens-library.com/info/viner.html (discussing similarities in the corporate governance structures of Korea, Italy, Germany, and other countries).
21
Corporate law imposes an important obligation on directors. Although the system
of corporate law is endogenous and, in the end, creates a potentially optimal outcome in
corporate governance, the specification of the law remains both of interest to and a determinant of corporate governance itself. For example, the fiduciary duty of managers and
directors via-A-vis shareholders is deeply entrenched in U.S. law. Hamermesh formulates
this duty as follows: "Delaware fully supports the proposition, dismissed in some quarters as
'myopic,' that the business and affairs of a Delaware for profit, stock corporation are to be
managed so as to maximize the value of the investment of one group and one group only,
its stockholders." Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The ShareholderRights By-Law: Doubts from Delaware, 5 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 9, 9 (1997) (footnotes omitted). Similarly, U.S. courts
have ruled that "[a] board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders." See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986). Blair and Stout take the controversial point of view that American corporate law
should dictate that directors act in the firm's, as well as the shareholders', interest. This
theory mimics the continental European corporate governance arrangement. For example, Dutch corporate law explicitly states that directors should serve the interests of the
firm as an entity. See M.M. Blair & L. Stout, A Theory of CorporationLaw as a Response to
ContractingProblems in Team Production, Brookings Institute Working Paper (1997).
22
See Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 1676 (discussing Germany's system of supervisory
boards); H. VAN EES & T. POSTMA, ON THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPERVISORY BOARDS IN THE
NETHERLANDS (Univ. of Groningen, Research Inst. SOM (Systems, Orgs. & Mgmt.) Research Paper No. 00E50, 2000), http://ideas.repec.org/p/dgr/rugsom/OOe50.html.
18
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Therefore, as in the United States, direct shareholder control over
23
management is limited.
Sufficient shareholder control is necessary in order to overcome
managerial inefficiencies, and important to address other objectives
of corporate governance. Thus, a successful corporate governance
system will seek to facilitate sufficient shareholder control, and a successful review of an already existing corporate governance system will
focus on whether or not that system exhibits sufficient shareholder
control.
C.

Objectives of Corporate Governance

Corporate governance is necessary for three reasons. First and
foremost, the unavoidably incomplete nature of the corporate contract implies a need for background rules that supply solutions to the
unforeseen contingencies facing investors. To the extent that corporate law is enabling, rather than mandatory, problems of incomplete
contracts can only be resolved if there is an adequate mechanism for
monitoring the behavior of managers, and if there is an honest judicial system capable of enforcing shareholders' contractual rights.
Second, the relationship between investors and managers
presents a straightforward agency problem related to the difficulties
inherent in the separation of ownership and control. Because of this
separation, measures to overcome potential managerial inefficiencies
are important. As the main objective of corporate governance is managerial monitoring, corporate governance is critical to minimizing the
effects of this agency problem.
Finally, the modern corporate enterprise requires a wide variety
of firm-specific investments. An important, though frequently ignored, characteristic of a properly functioning corporate governance
system is a mechanism that protects firm-specific investments made
through contributions of human capital to the firm. By protecting
these asset-specific investments, corporate governance systems provide
firms and individuals with the necessary incentives to make such investments. However, the presence of outside monitors may provide
disincentives for managers to make firm-specific human capital investments that leave them subject to monitor exploitation. 24 Monitoringbased systems of corporate governance may not be appropriate where
the goal is protection of asset-specific investments.
23 Shareholders exert significant control where no separation exists between ownership and control, as might be the case in family businesses. Observe, however, that the
corporate governance debate typically focuses on larger public firms characterized by a
separation of ownership and control, rather than on these family owned businesses.
See Ernst Maug, Board of Directors and Capital Structure: Alternative Forms of Corporate
24
Restructuring, 3J. CORP. FIN. 113, 120-37 (1997).
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Thus, the different objectives of corporate governance must trade
off. Improving the performance of a corporate governance system
along one vector may weaken that system's ability to perform along
another vector. For example, it is well known that the Italian corporate governance system's weakness stems from its lack of useful background rules addressing the agency problems between investors and
managers. 25 What is not well known, however, is that the Italian system also has strengths, as displayed by its ability to nurture. 26
D. Evaluating Corporate Governance Systems
How should we evaluate corporate governance arrangements, in
light of the previous discussion regarding corporate governance
objectives? One of the most striking features of the corporate governance debate is how divorced the rhetoric is from the reality. Many of
the corporate governance systems characterized as defective in fact
appear to produce impressive economic results. A number of countries, including Italy, France, and by some accounts the United States,
categorized as deficient in corporate governance have produced superior results in terms of productivity. 27 It is difficult to understand how
such "defective" systems are capable of generating so much wealth.
For example, Italy, which appears by all accounts to have a completely
dysfunctional corporate governance system, has a GDP per capita that
is not significantly different from that of Britain, whose corporate gov28
ernance system appears to be one of the best.

In addition, two paradigmatic governance systems-the German
model and the American model-are not really paradigms at all. In
reality, these systems exist sui generis. The German system does not
even serve as a model for other countries in Europe. For example,
the co-determination of workers and shareholders, a key characteristic
of the German model, 2 9 does not exist elsewhere. Countries such as
25
26
27

See Macey, supra note 1, at 143.
Id. at 142-43.
For examples of Italian productivity, see Fabrizio Barca, On Corporate Governance in
Italy: Issues, Facts and Agency, in BANK OF ITALY, ROME (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author); see also Top 100 GDP (per capita), http://www.nationmaster.com/graphT/eco.gdp-cap. For examples of French productivity, see id. For examples of American
productivity, see Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 63-64; Michael C. Jensen, The Modern IndustrialRevolution, Exit, and
the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48J. FIN. 831, 835-47 (1993); and Michael E. Porter,
CapitalDisadvantage:America's FailingCapital Investment System, -hARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct.
1992, at 65, 74-76.
28 See Kevin G. Lynch, Deputy Minister, Department of Industry, Canada, Building a
Global, Knowledge-Based Economy/Society for the 21st Century, Address Before the
SchoolNet National Advisory Board (Nov. 4, 1999); Top 100 GDP (per capita), http://
www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/eco-gdp-cap (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
29
Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 1675-83.
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Italy and France, which are characterized by extensive cross holdings30
and interference by the State, 3' and the Netherlands and Sweden,
which are characterized by autonomous boards that may be insufficiently accountable to shareholders, 3 2 have corporate governance systems that scarcely resemble the German model. Similarly, the
American system of corporate governance differs in important ways
from the current governance systems in other common law countries,
33such as Great Britain and Canada.
II
PROXIMITY AND OBJECTIVITY

A.

A Tradeoff: Shifting the Paradigm

Professors John Coffee, Jr. and Amar Bhide observe that share
ownership in the United States is quite dispersed. Although this dispersion generally will not permit effective management discipline, it
may promote liquidity. 34 This suggests that there is a tradeoff be35
tween liquidity and control. Some, however, including Erik Bergl6f,
Patrick Bolton, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 36 challenge the suggested link between dispersed ownership and lack of control. Bergl6f
argues that a dispersed ownership of shares does not necessarily imply
a lack of control. In particular, he states that "the link between liquidity and control is less direct than suggested" and that "[i] nvestors and
issuers have found a number of ways of keeping control concentrated
while increasing liquidity and limiting the capital committed." 37 Bol30
See David Berger, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 484, 504 (1991); Zohar Goshen, The
Efficiency of ControllingCorporateSelf-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL.L. REV. 393, 435-36

(2003).
31
See Olivier Pastr6, Corporate Governance: The End of "L'Exception Franfaise"?, 1998
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 79, 82-83; Lorenzo Stangnellini, Corporate Governance in Italy: Strong
Owners, FaithfulManagers: An Assessment and a Proposalfor Reform, 6 IND. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 91, 106-19 (1995).
32

See JONATHAN

R.

MACEY, SVENSK AKTIEBOLAGS RAr

I

OMVANDLING:

NOMISK ANALYs (CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SWEDEN:

EN RA-rTSEKO-

A LAW

AND

Eco-

27-33 (1993); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The
Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 9-10
(2001); Macey, supra note 8.
33
SeeJohn Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy
Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VANI. L. REV. 1699, 1714-20 (2002) (distinguishing
between the American and British corporate governance systems).
34
See Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity, 34J. FIN. ECON. 31, 41-45
(1993);John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The InstitutionalInvestor as CorporateMonitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1291-93 (1991).
NOMICS PERSPECTIVE)

35

Erik Berglif, CorporateGovernance, in THE

EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS: THE STATE OF

THE UNION AND AN AGENDA FOR THE MILLENIUM 147-84
36
See Patrick Bolton & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden,

(Ben Steil ed., 1996).
Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Con-

trol,
53J. FIN. 1, 14-23 (1998).
37 Bergl6f, supra note 35, at 157. Bergl6f suggests that cross holdings and pyramidal
structures could allow for disproportional voting rights considering the capital committed.
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367

ton and von Thadden make a more subtle argument: although a large
shareholder might be desirable, he may still desire an exit option. 38
Without sufficient liquidity in the market, exit is costly because an investor with a large ownership stake faces a considerable price impact
in his trades. As this might result in investors refusing a large ownership stake, liquidity may be a precondition to the existence of large
shareholders. Bolton and von Thadden's analysis, therefore, describes liquidity and the presence of large shareholders as complementary phenomena.
In addition to criticizing the claim that there is a tradeoff between liquidity and control, critics challenge the empirical observation that shareholders are very dispersed. The ownership structure in
the United States is not as dispersed as some suggest. While a crosscountry comparison indeed shows more dispersion in the United
States than elsewhere, American share ownership has become more
concentrated. 39 Much of this comes from the proliferation of pension
40
funds, mutual funds, and other institutional investors.
These observations are important because they qualify the tradeoff between liquidity and control. From our perspective, however, the
questions of how control is exercised and what makes control effective
are more important. Shareholders can exercise control through their
impact on the board of directors and through interventions in the
market for corporate control. As the liquidity-control tradeoff suggests, corporate governance systems worldwide may differ in effectiveness with respect to both of these channels. For example, the
continental European model focuses primarily on the shareholders'
impact on managerial decisionmaking via the board of directors, and
41
includes only a marginal role for the market for corporate control.
The Anglo-Saxon model, in contrast, places more weight on the market for corporate control and other third-party monitoring
42
mechanisms.
See id. Alternatively, Bengt Holmstr6m and Jean Tirole argue that liquidity may facilitate
more effective stock-based executive compensation schemes, and thereby improve managerial incentives. See Bengt Holmstr6m & Jean Tirole, Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring, 101 J. POL. ECON. 678, 707-08 (1993).
38
See Bolton & von Thadden, supra note 36, at 19.
39
See Bernard Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. Rav. 520, 521-24
(1990) (assumption of dispersed ownership becoming "increasingly obsolete."); Coffee,
supra note 34, at 1290-1317; John C. Coffee Jr., The SEC and the InstitutionalInvestor: A HalfTime Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 837, 906-07 (1994).
40
See Coffee, supra note 34, at 1290-1317.
41
SeeJoseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, The Evolution of Closely Held Business Forms in Europe, 26 J. CORP. L. 855, 874-75 (2001); Scott Mitnick, Cross-BorderMergers
and Acquisitions in Europe: ReformingBarriersto Takeovers, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 683, 684.
42
See Thomas J. Andre, Jr., Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of Anglo-Saxon Corporate
Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. Rav. 69, 106 (1998).
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Ultimately, we identify a fundamental tradeoff between proximity
and objectivity in supervision and monitoring. Well informed and objective monitors-the board or shareholders-provide the most effective supervision and monitoring. However, monitoring and
disciplining management are primary issues in the corporate governance debate, and this may require timely corrective action. The objectivity necessary for such timely corrections requires sufficient distance
between management and monitor, but being well informed requires
close and intrusive contact. Such analysis illustrates one aspect of the
tradeoff between proximity and objectivity.
1.

Theoretical Underpinningsof the Objectivity-Proximity Tradeoff

While it is obvious that close proximity will create increased levels
of information, it is less clear why objectivity requires distance between management and monitor. Public choice and psychology research illustrates that boards with close proximity to management are
likely to become captured by management. Psychologists, for example, have observed a "foot-in-the-door" phenomenon, which predicts
that individuals will agree to a series of escalating commitments once
they make an initial commitment. 4 3 Thus, earlier decisions, once
made and defended, affect future decisions such that later decisions
comport with earlier decisions. As applied to board members, this
phenomenon suggests that board members begin to identify strongly
with management after some agreement with management's decisions. 44 Studies of the decisionmaking process during the Vietnam
War era reveal that this country's leaders paid more attention to new
information compatible with their earlier decisions, and tended to ig45
nore information that contradicted those earlier assumptions.
These studies suggest that once ideas and beliefs become ingrained in
the mind of a board of directors, the possibility of altering those beliefs decreases substantially: "beliefs are like possessions" and "[w] hen
someone challenges our beliefs, it is as if someone criticized our
possessions."

46

Furthermore, social psychologists have found that people tend to
internalize their vocational roles. Occupational choices, such as the
choice to accept employment as a corporate director, strongly influSee DAVID G. MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 46-49 (1983).
See id.
45
See Ralph K. White, Selective Inattention, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 1971, at 47 (observing
that "[t)here was a tendency, when actions were out of line with ideas, for decision-makers
to align their ideas with their actions"); see also id. at 49.
46
THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE KNOw WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBILITY OF HuMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE 86 (1991) (footnote omitted) (quoting Robert P. Abelson, Beliefs Are
Like Possessions, 16J. THEORY Soc. BEHAV. 222 (1986)).
43

44
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ence our attitudes and values. 47 In the context of boards of directors,
this internalization leads board members to be influenced by management's perspective. This in turn causes board members to lose their
objectivity.

48

This analysis applies what Daniel Kahneman and Dan Lovallo describe as a cognitive bias, or the "inside view." 49 Like parents unable
to evaluate their children objectively, proximate monitors reject statistical reality and view their firms as above average. Objective monitors,
by contrast, evaluate management decisions and compare incumbent
50
management and rival management teams dispassionately.
Similarly, proximate monitors may be afflicted with what is
known as an "anchoring bias," which leads them to establish or
anchor their initial views and opinions of management. 5 1 This generally occurs during the time that a firm retains a monitor or recruits an
outside director. Once a proximate monitor develops a positive view
52
of management, that opinion is anchored and does not change.
In addition to psychological barriers to objectivity, proximate
boards lack objectivity from an economic perspective. Board supervision generally means that the board is jointly responsible with management for the state of the firm. The degree of joint responsibility
depends on the level of the board's involvement with the firm. Because of this joint responsibility, the board may abstain from corrective action based on reputational reasons as well as cognitive biases.
The board might abstain, for example, because corrective action
53
could reveal the board's failure to take the proper course of action.
Boards may resist corrective action for other reasons as well.
They invest considerably in the information specific to the existing
management; changing management would thus potentially dilute
the value of this investment. Moreover, to a large extent, boards of
47
Cf Jerald G. Bachman & Patrick M. O'Malley, Self-Esteem in Young Men: A Longitudinal Analysis of the Impact of Educationaland OccupationalAttainment, 35 J. PERSONALrry & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 365, 370-76 (1977) (discussing the effect of vocational choices on self-esteem).
48
This problem would not arise with shareholders in public markets who have little
or no contact with management.
49
See Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCL 17, 24-27 (1993).
50
Cf id. at 26-27 (noting that an insider's prediction will generally, but not invariably, result in optimistic forecasts).
51
Cf Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 362-63 (discussing the anchoring bias and its effect on corporate contracting).
52
Cf id. (noting that once anchors are established, adjustments to them are
minimal).
53
This analysis assumes that the board monitors management. In a two-tier system
(e.g., the Netherlands and Germany), this is clearly the supervisory board's task. Under a
one-tier system (e.g., the United States and the United Kingdom), however, nonexecutive
directors act as monitors.
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directors resemble legislatures with essentially one interest group constituency: management. Management not only has the time and resources to cultivate the board, it also presents the board with the
information necessary to make decisions. Over a wide range of issues,
all management must do to sway the board's decision is present information in a manner likely to generate support or to achieve effective
capture of the board. It is not surprising, therefore, that boards often
54
lack objectivity.
2.

Tangible Examples of Objectivity and Proximity

Roni Michaely and Kent Womack illustrate the difference between proximate and objective monitors in the corporate governance
context in a review of analysts' recommendations of companies that
have been taken public by the broker-dealer firms for which they
work. 55 They show that the stocks underwriter analysts recommend
perform worse than stocks recommended by analysts who work for
banks that did not participate in the underwriting. 56 The underwriter
analysts' recommendations show significant elements of bias. 57 Michaely and Womack explain that the systematically over-optimistic predictions of analysts who are affiliated with underwriters, unlike
independent, objective analysts, are the result of "cognitive biases,"
which lead them to "genuinely believe that the firms they underwrite
' 58
are better than the firms underwritten by other investment banks.
Reality does not seem to change their prior opinions.
According to Michaely and Womack, the underwriter-affiliated
analysts have more and better information than unaffiliated analysts,
because the investment bankers participating in the underwriting
have superior access to the information and management of the firms
they have underwritten. This information access advantage comes
from analyst participation in the due diligence and marketing of the
new IPO. Thus, the comparison between underwriter analysts and unaffiliated analysts provides a concrete illustration of the tradeoff between proximity and objectivity in corporate governance. Michaely
54
Stephen Bainbridge offers group decisionmaking as a solution to nonobjective
boards. He emphasizes, however, not the effectiveness of monitoring the CEO, but rather
the potential benefits of team decisionmaking versus individual decisionmaking. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmakingin Corporate Governance,55 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 19-38 (2002). Bengt Holstr6m defends the opposite view, however, and argues
that group decisionmaking may undermine each individual's incentive to engage in monitoring. See Bengt Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELLJ. ECON. 324, 326-28, 334-39
(1982).
55 Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter
Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653, 660-80, 683 (1999).
56 See id. at 657, 680.
57 See id. at 677-80.

58

Id. at 680.

2004]

MONITORING CORPORATE PERFORMANCE

and Womack's results are consistent with and supportive of the view
that an objective monitor performs better than a proximate monitor,
despite the proximate monitor's clearly superior access to information. Notably, the analysts that Michaely and Womack studied were
compensated in part by their perceived external reputation and in
part by revenue generated by their firms' services for companies seeking to go public. 59 Thus, their compensation ultimately suffers when
they make bad recommendations, because these recommendations
hurt their external reputations. This exploitation of analysts' biases
does not, however, require analysts to be dishonest. Although some
commentators blame analyst dishonesty for over-optimistic predictions, our theory merely holds that analysts' ultimate involvement induces bias.
Cognitive bias affects not only analysts employed by underwriters,
but all proximate monitors to some extent. For example, it is widely
believed that when firms are forced to change accountants, the new
accountants may be inclined to take large write-offs relative to their
predecessors because they can get a fresh start and blame problems
on the old auditor. 60 This fact, coupled with new legislation that requires firms to change auditors every five years,6 ' suggests that accountants, like analysts, are vulnerable to capture. Arguably, new
accountants are willing to take write-offs because they are not yet captured and are therefore more objective than their predecessors who
were too intimately involved with management to audit the firm objectively. The accounting aspect of Enron's collapse exemplifies the extent to which accountants can become captured by the management
of the firms that they audit. Enron could have avoided at least some
of its troubles if it had hired new accountants periodically instead of
maintaining its relationship with Arthur Anderson; this would have
likely resulted in concomitantly more objective audits. 6 2 Similarly, if

Arthur Andersen had better internal monitoring and control systems,
then more objective, noncaptured supervisors could have resisted the
See id. at 659-60.
See HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 551 (1985) (statement of Rep. Richard Shelby) ("How can
an auditing firm remain independent... when it has established long-term personal and
professional relationships with a company by auditing the same client for many years, some
10, 20, or 30 years?").
61
See The Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 203, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1).
62
See Beth Healy, Under Scrutiny: It's March Madness for Accountants as Annual Meeting
Season Begins and, in the Post-Enron Era, All Eyes Are on the Books, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10,
2002, at C1 (quoting one source who stated that "taking such steps as changing accountants every five years and providing ample disclosure of the fees it pays firms" would "go a
long way toward easing investor fears" in the post-Enron era).
59
60

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:356

more aggressive accounting techniques utilized by the (captured) Arthur Andersen accountants working on the Enron audit engagement
team.
Smith v. Van Gorkom63 provides another, now infamous, example
of the potential proximate monitor cognitive bias. In Van Gorkom, the
court held the entire Trans Union board of directors personally liable
for failing to follow adequate procedures when considering (and approving) a tender offer unfavorable to shareholders. 64 In this case,
which ultimately revolutionized the quality of corporate decisionmaking, Jerome W. Van Gorkom, a Trans Union board member and management team member, advocated an offer that was held to be flawed
because it undervalued the firm's shares. 65 Notwithstanding Van
Gorkom's suspect motivations-he was nearing retirement and probably engineered the merger agreement to serve his own interest in liquidating his shares of the company rather than to serve the
shareholders' interest-the board of directors approved the deal with
seemingly little thought. 66 Unquestionably, " [ b]y today's standards,
the board's procedures seem woefully inadequate. ' 67 Indeed, the
Trans Union board "did not read the merger agreement, much less
discuss and deliberate its contents in any detail." 68 The board inappropriately "delegated too much power to Van Gorkom in his negotiations" and did not "properly monitor [his] negotiations." 69

Not

surprisingly, five of the Trans Union board members were inside directors who had each been with the company for an average of 23.2
years.7 0 However, the board's decision in this case was not tainted by
71
self-dealing, conflict of interest, ineptitude, laziness, or corruption.
This case illustrates that proximate monitors are susceptible to bias,
and that boards of directors in particular may become too reliant on
and captured by the judgment of the management of the firms they
ostensibly oversee.

63 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
64 Id. at 871-72. See generallyJonathan R. Macey, Smith v. Van Gorkom: Insights About
C.E.O.s, CorporateLaw Rules, and theJurisdictionalCompetitionfor Corporate Charters,96 Nw. U.
L. REv. 607, 607 (2002) (arguing that while the Van Gorkom decision "may have dramatically improved the quality of deliberations in corporate boardrooms, the imposition of
liability on the defendants in the case seems profoundly unjust").
65 See id. at 610-11.
66 See id. at 609-10.
67 Id. at 607.
68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 608.

71

Id.

at 609.
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The Corporate Governance Structure

Three groups determine the corporate governance structure of a
firm: management, the board, and the shareholders. 72 Management
makes decisions regarding strategy or chooses to invest in a project,
and the board acting alone or with the shareholders, monitors and
possibly intervenes to correct managerial decisions. 73 This Article will
focus on the board as monitor.
After management endorses a project, monitors will act immediately if they have timely information that allows them to assess the quality of the project. Alternatively, monitors might intervene at a later
point if the project's advantages or disadvantages become readily apparent to them. The likelihood of immediate monitoring depends on
the distance between the board and management.7 4 The smaller the
distance between these groups, the higher the probability that
75
monitors will receive information immediately.
However, even if monitors receive timely information, monitoring will not always be successful. 76 Success depends on the quality of
the monitor, as well as on the timing of the monitor's receipt of information. 77 Also, if the monitor does not correct managerial failure immediately, it can always intervene later regardless of the cause of the
initial monitoring failure (i.e., regardless of whether the monitoring
was unsuccessful or the monitor simply did not receive timely information). From a firm value-maximization viewpoint, early correction is
preferable to late intervention. By the time a late intervention occurs,
losses will have already accumulated. Abstaining from intervention in
the case of managerial failure is the most costly alternative of all because abstinence will lead to continued value dissipation. Regardless
of its increased costs, however, the effectiveness of late intervention is
important because early monitoring may not always be effective. Early
monitoring will fail when the monitor does not obtain timely information on managerial failure and cannot, therefore, correct managerial
failure early, or when the monitor fails in its monitoring.
One difficulty of relying on late intervention is that a monitor
may choose to forego the late intervention decision for reputational
reasons. As late intervention might highlight an early monitoring failure and indirectly signal monitoring inability, the monitor may
72
See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES
2000).
73
See id. at 5-12.
74
See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
75
See id.
76
See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
77

See discussion supra Part II.A.1-2.
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choose to abstain from late intervention even if he realizes that a bad
78
decision has been made.
C.

Information Structure, Remuneration and Objectives

An examination of the information structure within systems of
corporate governance aids in understanding how and why intervention decisions are made. Outsiders (including shareholders) are generally able to observe the monitor's intervention decision. Thus, late
intervention is a drastic action. Before a late intervention, outsiders
do not have access to information. This creates motivation to abstain
from late intervention because at least for some time abstention might
hide the negative information on project quality from outsiders and
indirectly might also hide the monitor's early monitoring failure.
When a monitor enjoys close proximity, late intervention is informative to outsiders because it indicates that the monitor initially
failed to monitor effectively. Late intervention by a proximate monitor reveals the monitor's failure to recognize and block a bad decision. Good managers do not require intervention as often as bad
managers, however, so lack of intervention may simply indicate the
presence of high quality managers. The negative signal associated
with late intervention may cause monitors to distort their intervention
decisions. 79 As outsiders often cannot observe the success or failure of
early monitoring, monitors may choose not to intervene in order to
80
mask their own failure.
The monitor's ability to shape its intervention decision to avoid
tainting its image as a good monitor is particularly significant because
remuneration is linked to reputation. Arguably, the monitor thus
seeks to maximize its reputation in any decision to intervene late.

The probability that the monitor will receive timely information
influences whether or not the monitor will be forced to intervene late.
This probability necessarily depends on the monitor's proximity; a distant monitor is less likely to have the necessary information to correct
managerial decisions early. Since the corporate governance system
publicly dictates this distance, the distant monitor's decision to intervene carries less reputational stigma than does a proximate monitor's
decision to intervene. Figure 1 summarizes the key events and decisions for proximate and distant monitors.
Signaling concerns are crucial to the monitor's late intervention
decision. Because the monitor's objective is to maximize its reputation, its choice of action depends on the publicly known distance be78
79
80

See discussion supra Part II.A. 1.
See discussion supra Parts II.A.1, I.B.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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t=O
" Management chooses project
" Proximate monitor (with high probability)
receives timely information about the project's
quality
" Proximate monitor does or does not correct
managerial failure
" Distant monitor as yet unaware of managerial
failure

t=1
e Monitor observes quality of
the project
e Objective (distant) monitor
intervenes, but proximate
monitor may not
o Monitor's reputation or
remuneration determined

tween the monitor and management and on the observed quality of
the project, which may point to an earlier monitoring failure. Of
course, where the monitor is an outside (distant) monitor, without
connection to the earlier decision or access to timely information, late
intervention will not harm the monitor's reputation and may very well
enhance it.
D.

The Analysis

As discussed above, sometimes a proximate monitor may attempt
to avoid reputation downgrade by not intervening. Thus, proximate
monitors might decide not to intervene, regardless of whether a management decision requires correction. An important exception arises
in the case where an inside monitor can prove that management defrauded or somehow deprived it of timely information, thereby making it impossible for the monitor to operate successfully. Distant
monitors, who are always deprived of timely information, have an easier time making this claim. Where inside monitors are involved, there
will always be some doubt about whether they could have discovered a
problem if they had been either more attentive, more able, or both.
Regardless of this always existing doubt, all monitors would be willing
to intervene if this exception applied. Thus, in the extreme case
where early monitoring could never be expected to be effective because nobody receives timely information, monitors will intervene
efficiently.
Accordingly, monitoring efficiency may improve if corporate governance systems increase the distance between the monitor and management in an effort to obtain greater monitor objectivity. This
solution is somewhat problematic, however, because increased distance prevents the monitor from receiving timely information and allows bad projects to escape early correction. The solution does offer a
countervailing benefit; intervention policy becomes tougher and late
intervention less stigmatizing. Where the monitors have sufficient distance from the original decision, they will not hesitate to intervene
later. Thus, the question becomes whether this negative volume effect

376
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(more bad projects "survive" early monitoring) would be offset by a
positive behavioraleffect (intervention policy would become tougher).
These considerations provide further support for a tradeoff between proximity and objectivity. Objectivity accompanies distance
and may improve behavior, while proximity brings more timely information and early intervention. Two considerations suggest that intervention is likely to be more prevalent when monitors have distance.
First, distant monitors can evaluate the quality of management's decision more objectively, because such monitors are not co-opted by
their participation in the decisionmaking process into believing the
original decision to be a good one. Once a monitor has committed
itself to a decision, it becomes more difficult to switch gears and decide that the decision was flawed. 8 1 Second, even after the closely
proximate monitor recognizes a poor decision, it may be reluctant to
intervene because such intervention reveals that the monitor's earlier
acquiescence in the original decision resulted from bad judgment.
Distance may help resolve this problem because the stigma of intervention is less likely to attach to a proximate monitor.
Although increasing the distance between the monitors and management may increase efficiency, it can only do so if the tougher intervention policy expected from outside, independent monitors (the
behavioral effect) can discipline management at a rate effective
enough to compensate for the fact that outside monitors are unable
to stop bad projects in as timely a fashion as inside monitors are able
to stop them (the volume effect). It may be that increasing the distance between the monitor and management reduces monitoring efficiency so severely that more bad projects ultimately slip through,
despite the tougher intervention that occurs when such projects are
discovered. Thus, the behavioral effect must overcome the negative
volume effect in order for distance to increase efficiency. Efficiency
results even if distance will allow bad projects to continue unchecked,
if the behavioral improvement decreases the number of bad projects
ultimately approved. Moreover, the behavioral improvement must
sufficiently outweigh the volume effect if it is to overcome the additional cost of later intervention.
Simply put, when establishing systems and institutions for monitoring, firms must choose whether the monitor will be objective or
proximate. If the firm chooses a close, proximate monitor, it will benefit from early correction (a proximate monitor may be able to reject
bad projects sometimes even before they are begun). However, the
firm must bear the costs of capture and the concomitant risks that
when poor decisions are made, they will not be corrected in a timely
81

See supra Part II.A. 1.
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fashion because the monitor is worried about its reputation. If a firm
chooses a distant, objective monitor, it will get the benefits of bold,
consistent intervention without the risks of capture or worries about
the effects on the monitor's reputation. However, the firm must then
bear the cost that poor decisions will not be avoided or corrected
early. This analysis highlights an additional flaw associated with monitoring by boards of directors who are closely involved in management's decisionmaking processes: the risk that monitors will fail to
punish bad managers, even after managers' decisions are revealed asflawed,
for fear that their own reputations will suffer.
As we emphasize in a related work,8 2 the irreversibility of investment dictates the choice between proximity and objectivity. Similar to
traditional manufacturing, when investments are sunk, timely correction is crucially important. Late intervention ceases to be valuable,
irreversible investments that dissipate once made. Early correction is
therefore paramount. Because the type of investment is industry specific, firm or industry characteristics dictate the optimal corporate
governance system.
III
ADAPTABILITY

A.

Role of Adaptability

The analysis has, thus far, focused exclusively on a one dimensional interpretation of proximity and objectivity; that is, it was assumed that the distance between monitor and management directly
translates into the monitor's willingness to intervene. Obviously, this
oversimplifies the matter. The monitor's willingness to engage in corrective action is undoubtedly affected by many other factors.
Various recently surfaced corporate governance issues may be
viewed in the context of the proximity-objectivity tradeoff. For example, four groups of measures, which are newly cited as important to
improving corporate governance,8 3 can all be connected to the objectivity-proximity debate: (1) measures aimed at ensuring that nonexecutive directors are more independent and professional that will
achieve greater objectivity; (2) measures increasing shareholders'
rights that will tend towards more effective intervention by an objec82 Arnoud W. A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, The Trade-off Between Objectivity and
Proximity in Corporate Governance (Nov. 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Amsterdam).
83
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tive, distant monitor; (3) measures improving disclosure and transparency requirements that will increase the efficacy of distant
monitors; and (4) ownership structure issues, such as concentration of
shareholdings, which relate to the ability of shareholders to act as effective outside monitors.
The first group includes the appointment process of nonexecutive directors, the remuneration of those directors, the desirability of a
two-tier board structure (e.g., whether the nonexecutive supervisory
board should be separated from the CEO and the management
board), and the personal liability of directors. The main question
concerns whether nonexecutive directors can be incentivized to be
sufficiently accountable, so that they may preserve their independence
and overcome problems of proximity. The authors assume that they
can but this analysis raises considerable doubt.
The second group addresses shareholder rights, resolving
whether information problems (due to distance) and free-rider
problems can be resolved to facilitate monitoring and prompt corrective action. The desirability of proxy voting, the presence of antitakeover measures, and the protection of the minority shareholder also
belong in this group.
The third and fourth groups address ownership structure, transparency, and disclosure. Ownership structure directly relates to the
role and effectiveness of shareholders. Are large shareholders necessary to facilitate shareholder activism? Are cross holdings helpful? Is
a stable core shareholder base desirable? Transparency and disclosure
requirements, among other things, may help to overcome the information gap between shareholders and management.
At the core, all of these issues relate to the adaptability of corporate governance arrangements, and they might be particularly important considering the suggested "either-or" solutions to the optimal
governance regime described above. 84 The either-or solution to the
optimal structure of corporate governance may go hand-in-hand with
other features that mitigate the disadvantages of proximity-based and
objectivity-based systems. For example, a proximity-based system with
finely textured board involvement may benefit from shareholder activism. Shareholders might succeed in aligning the board's incentives
with their own or, at the very least, mitigating capture by management. Reputation distortions may then be partially diminished, and
the board may choose to intervene more frequently.
These observations suggest that board monitoring and the market for corporate control are potentially complementary. If the board
knows that it will be ousted following a successful disciplinary take84

See supra Part H.A.
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over, it may become a more vigilant monitor. Thus, a takeover threat
may not only discipline management; it may also discipline an unsuccessful monitoring board.
Clearly, adaptability is crucial. The issues of ownership structure,
shareholder rights, disclosure, and transparency all play a key role in
facilitating shareholder activism. Measures addressing these issues
may help to discipline management and the board in both proximityand objectivity-based systems. Similarly, in both types of systems, measures to facilitate the proper functioning of nonexecutive (or supervi8
sory) directors are conceivable.

B.

5

Analysis Application: The United States, Continental Europe,
and Italy

This section evaluates corporate governance systems by how well
they fill gaps in contingent contracts, resolve agency problems, and
promote investments in human capital. The discussion focuses on the
adaptability of those systems. By understanding the strengths and
weaknesses of each system, it is possible to understand how these systems adapt to overcome their weaknesses.
Firms that operate within competitive product, labor, and capital
markets face strong incentives to innovate around any defects that
may exist within any particular set of corporate governance rules.
Such innovation reflects the notion of adaptability. The following discussion will consider the interplay between the objectivity-proximity
tradeoff and adaptability.
The United States is an example of a corporate governance system in which the entities that monitor and discipline may lack information, but enjoy objectivity. 6 Italy provides an example of a
defective or failed corporate governance system. 8 7 The Italian system
permits neither the separation of ownership and control, which brings
distance and produces objectivity, nor the continuous and textured
monitoring of institutions or supervisory boards that potentially provide monitors with real-time information about corporate perform85
For example, although the Anglo-Saxon one-tier system is objectivity-based, it includes measures that may provide proximity benefits. For example, the practice that some
companies employ of splitting the roles of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman
of the Board between an inside officer and an outside, independent director, is designed
to achieve objectivity benefits, while the practice employed by other companies in the Anglo-Saxon system of combining the two roles in a single individual, is presumably designed
to capture certain proximity benefits. See Ben White, Save the Chairfor the Chief.; There's
Concern but No Consensus About CEOs LeadingBoards, WASH. PosT, Feb. 7, 2003, at El, available at http://www.compensationresources.com/pressroom/SavetheChairfortheChief.
html.
86
See Macey, supra note 1, at 136; supra note 19 and accompanying text.
87
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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ance. 88 Although it is possible to identify corporate governance
systems that lack both objectivity and proximity (i.e., Italy), it is virtually impossible to identify systems that feature both traits
simultaneously.
1.

Corporate Governance in the United States

The American system of corporate governance receives high
marks for its ability to fill in gaps in contingent contracts, mediocre
marks for its ability to resolve agency problems, and poor marks for its
ability to promote human capital investments. With regard to filling
gaps in contingent contracts, the American system, while far from perfect, does a good job of policing management efforts to divert corporate assets to their own uses. American law assiduously protects
minority shareholders from exploitation,8 9 including those shareholders who invest in subsidiaries of firms that are part of larger corporate
groups. 90 U.S. law also vigorously polices against director conflict of
interest transactions. 9 1 Most importantly, with respect to shareholder
protection, U.S. directors owe a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to
their shareholders under basic American corporate governance prin-

88 Both Germany and the Netherlands utilize a supervisory board, two-tier corporate
governance system. See supra notes 20-22.
89 See Anupam Chandler, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119
(2003). See also Katzowitz v. Sidler, 249 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1969) (holding that the majority
shareholders breached a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by offering them additional shares, notwithstanding the minority shareholders' right of first refusal, because the
sole reason for the issuance of new stock was to freeze out one of the shareholders and
there was no legitimate business purpose for the issuance); see also Grace Bros., Ltd. v.
Uniholding Corp., 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 101 (2000) (holding that minority shareholder's
complaint, alleging that majority shareholder allowed its wholly-owned subsidiary to assume control over the corporation's largest asset in an attempt to gain the benefits of a
squeeze out merger without having to ensure that it was fair to minority shareholders,
stated a valid claim for breach of fiduciary duty); Orsi v. Sunshine Art Studios, Inc., 874 F.
Supp. 471 (D. Mass. 1995) (stating that if a freeze out is unfair to a minority shareholder,
because of usurpation of corporate opportunity or self-dealing, the minority shareholder is
entitled to relief from the majority shareholders for breach of their fiduciary duty); cf
Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993) (holding that majority shareholders did not
breach their fiduciary duty to the minority shareholders by establishing an insurance and
retirement plan that gave certain benefits to majority shareholders, even though these
plans afforded the majority shareholders more liquidity).
90
See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720, 722-23 (Del. 1971) (holding
that a parent corporation owes a fiduciary duty to its subsidiary when there are parentsubsidiary dealings, and remanding the case for determination of whether the parent's selfdealing contract with their subsidiary and responsibility for the subsidiary's noncompliance
with the contract constituted a breach of fiduciary duty).
91
Mark Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233 (2002). See, e.g., MODEL
Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.60-8.63 (1999); see also AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§1.23, 5.02.
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ciples.92 In addition to these shareholder protections,"3 a critical element of U.S. corporate law is that most of its provisions enable rather
than mandate. In other words, investors can customize their own arrangements with the firms in which they have invested and tailor these
94
arrangements to correspond to their particular needs.
Generally, U.S. law deals well with crude efforts by managers to
abscond with corporate assets. But in recent years, the U.S. system has
not dealt as well with other, more subtle aspects of the agency problem faced by investors in public companies, such as managerial entrenchment amidst hostile takeover bids or excessive managerial
compensation. The U.S. system of corporate governance separates
ownership and capital to a larger extent than do systems in other
countries. 95 Furthermore, the United States also depends more on
capital markets and less on banks or large shareholders.9 6 As a consequence of this historical phenomenon, which is at least partially attributable to political causes,9 7 American corporate governance
performance hinges in part on its ability to resolve agency problems
that result from the separation of ownership and management. These
agency problems are a unique characteristic of the U.S. public
corporation.
The U.S. system has traditionally confronted agency problems
through takeovers. A wealth of theoretical arguments and empirical
evidence supports the proposition that takeovers effectively address
corporate governance problems, particularly by controlling manage92
See Kenneth E. Scott, CorporationLaw and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 937-46 (1983); see also Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am., 53 A. 842, 857-58 (N.J. Ch. 1903) (granting an injunction against the merger negotiated by Prudential's directors whereby both Prudential and its counter-party would be insulated from hostile takeover); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378,
380-81 (N.Y. 1918) (holding that a chairman of the executive committee breached his
duty of loyalty to shareholders when he caused the corporation to contract with another
company of which he was president, even though he disclosed his affiliation with the latter,
because he failed to disclose the known pitfalls of the contract to the board of the former
corporation).
93 Note that American shareholders are also owed a duty of care. In Van Gorkom, for
example, the board of directors breached their duty of care to shareholders by failing to
engage in a sufficiently long or thorough review of a takeover bid. See 488 A.2d 858, 869,
873 (Del. 1985). The court came to this holding notwithstanding the fact that the price
offered for the company's shares far exceeded the firm's market price, because the court
found that the stock of the company was historically overvalued and that the company
should have gone to greater lengths to discern the stock's actual value. Id. at 876.
94 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Structure of Corporation Laws, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1416 (1989).
95
See JAMEs A. FANTO, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW 18

(1997).
96 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of CorporateGovernance, 52 J. FIN.
737, 754 (1997).
97
See MARKJ. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERs: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 19-50(1994).
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rial discretion.9 8 Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny observe that
"[t]akeovers are Widely interpreted as the critical corporate governance mechanism in the United States, without which managerial discretion cannot be effectively controlled." 99
Several political developments may have weakened the effectiveness of the market for corporate control. Specifically, the collapse of
Drexel Burnham Lambert contributed to the end of the 1980s takeover wave by depriving bidders of ready access to the significant capital necessary to finance a hostile acquisition.10 0 Also, state legislators
responded to political pressure to impose legal curbs on the market
for corporate control by passing antitakeover legislation. 10 ' State
10 2
courts responded by ruling against takeovers.
These events, however, posed only temporary problems. Takeover entrepreneurs-and their legal and financial strategists-are
much more dynamic and inventive than most people suppose. The
junk bond market collapsed in the late 1980s, but only for a short
time. 10 3 Soon, not only were high-yield bonds back, but hedge fund
growth supplemented their role in financing takeovers, as did the increased availability of commercial bank financing.' 0 4 The total capital
available to finance arbitrage and other takeover related activities is
greater today than it was in the 1980s. 10 5 More importantly, institutional shareholders have the potential to become more activist. 10 6 In
particular, they can use their leverage to try to ensure that the balance
of power in the market for corporate control does not tip too far in
favor of incumbent management. 0 7 With the effective bundling of
hostile bids, consent solicitation, and proxy fights, hostile takeovers,
which had virtually disappeared as a corporate governance device at
the start of the 1990s, continue to mitigate managerial agency
problems. 10 8 Nevertheless, managerial entrenchment problems have
98
99
100

See, e.g., Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 96, at 756-57.
Id. at 756 (citations omitted).
See Bailey Morris, Drexel Case Renews Fears over junk Bond' Market, TIMES (London),
Sept. 10, 1988, at 21.
101
See Michael C. Jensen, The Modern IndustrialRevolution, Exit, and the Failureof Internal
Control Systems, 48J. FIN. 831, 832 (1993).
102 Id.
103 See id. at 838-39.
104 See id.
105
See id. at 836-39.
106 SeeJill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will it Happen? Will it Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J.
1009, 1031-32 (1994).
107
See id. at 1032 & n.77.
108

See LUCIAN

BEBCHUK & OLIVER HART, TAKEOVER BIDS VS. PROXY FIGHTS IN CONTESTS

FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (European Corp. Governance Inst. ECGI Working Paper Series
in Finance, Working Paper No. 04, 2002). Takeover entrepreneurs and arbitrageurs have
also introduced an innovation, the shareholder rights bylaw, that is likely to further invigorate the market for corporate control by eliminating the ability of a target company's
board to keep poison pill defensive devices in place once an outside bid has been made.
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far from disappeared. The various highly publicized corporate scandals such as Enron and WorldCom indicate that there is substantial
room for improvement.
As noted at the outset, corporate governance systems work to reassure suppliers of capital. 10 9 Firm-specific human capital is one of
the more important and illustrative types of capital. Lack of such capital is where the vaunted U.S. system of corporate governance reveals
its deepest flaws. The U.S. system relies on capital markets, which
pressure corporate managers to deliver profits. This structure makes
the system notable for its objectivity, dynamism, and flexibility. In particular, participants at all levels of U.S. labor markets are highly mobile. Hiring and firing workers is generally easier in the U.S. than in
Europe orJapan.1 10 These features may have caused the relatively low
rates of unemployment in the United States during the late 1990s.11 1
The advantage of flexibility is offset, to some extent, by the costs that
result from the fact that employees, including high-level managers,
cannot make credible, long-term commitments to their firms. This
reduces both the incentives of managers to make firm-specific investments in employment relationships, and the incentives of firms to
seek such investments.
Another weak aspect of the U.S. corporate governance system is
rooted in the fact that U.S. investors are not relationship investors:
they typically move in and out of their investor status though arms-

Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder Rights Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv.
835, 835 (1993). The new technique is simple. A shareholder proposes an amendment to
his firm's bylaws requiring the company's poison pill (and other defensive measures) to
expire automatically whenever the firm receives an all cash offer for 100 percent of the
firm's stock at a price at least twenty-five percent above market. The firm can retain its
poison pill only if the shareholders vote to retain it within 90 days of receiving such an
offer. Id. at 861. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) currently requires firms
to include these shareholder proposals in their proxy solicitation materials, at their own
expense, under SEC Rule 14a-8. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2003). By refusing to permit
companies to exclude shareholder proposals from their proxy solicitations, the SEC has set
the stage for a major legal battle that will ensue when shareholders propose and approve a
proposed shareholder rights bylaw, and directors, claiming that the shareholders wrongfully usurped their right to run the company, challenge the bylaw in court. If Delaware
judges fail to respect shareholder rights by refusing to uphold rights bylaws, institutional
investors may start demanding that their firms reincorporate in jurisdictions which provide
more rigorous protection for shareholders. However, even if legal arguments do not persuade the Delaware judiciary, pressure by institutional investors to find ajurisdiction hospitable to these arrangements may well ensure this long-term viability.
109
See supra Part I.C.
110
See G7Jobs Summit, THE JoBs LET-rER, Apr. 19, 1996, at 1, 1; see also StewartJ. Schwab,
The United States, in CORPORATE RESTRUCrURING: THE ROLE OF LABOUR LAw (Robert BlanPain ed., 2003).
III See Constance Sorrentino & Joyanna Moy, US. Labor Market Performance in International Perspective, MONTHLY LAB. REv., June 2002, at 15, 17.
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length market transactions." 12 As such, American investors depend
on publicly available information that is inevitably incomplete, crude,
and outdated upon receipt. U.S. investors generally do not receive
the same privileged, detailed information about firms in which they
have invested that institutional investors in other countries may enjoy.
The answers to this deficiency under U.S. law are complex and extensive disclosure requirements. 1 3 While these mandatory disclosure
rules may have improved the quality of the information received by
investors, they do not change the fact that information is received
only after critical decisions are made.
2.

ContinentalEurope

As was argued in Section II, continental European systems with
large shareholders and direct control by supervisory boards or banks
allow not only for finer information partitioning, and thus for more
informed monitoring, but also for investor participation in decisions
114
before they are made.
A further advantage of this system of finely textured monitoring is
that monitoring takes place on an outgoing basis, rather than episodically, in situations that are perceived as crises. 1 5 This sort of monitoring permits not only more informed monitoring, but also pre-emptive
intervention in corporate decisions that more distant monitors are unable to effectuate.
The principle problem with the continental European system is
that an element of capture may prevent effective governance. 1 6 Because the monitoring of corporate action is accomplished primarily by
proximate monitors, such as large block-holders, these monitors may
be both unable to objectively evaluate management proposals and un112 This practice is so widespread that it has become known as the "Wall Street Rule,"
according to which, dissatisfied investors simply sell their stock, rather than attempt to
influence management. Alfred Conrad, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 117, 144-45 ("[T]he Wall Street Rule fits the typical individual
investor.").
113

See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE '33 AND '34 ACTS: THE WHEAT REPORT (1969)

(discussing the registration requirements under the '33 and '34 Acts); Jason Michael Craft,
Note and Comment, What's all the Commotion?: An Examination of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's Regulation PD, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 119, 121-23 (2001); Caroline F. Hayday,
Note, Shedding Light on Wall Street: Why Reg. ED. Is Appropriatein the InformationAge, 81 B.U.
L. REv. 843, 844, 849-50 (2001).
114 See supra Parts I.B, II.A.1.
115

MARCO BECHT ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL 37 (European Corp.

Governance Inst. Working Paper Series in Finance, Working Paper No. 02, 2002); see also
Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, RelationalInvesting and Agency Theory, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 1033
(1994) (arguing that large shareholder structures permit better monitoring and less myopia (short-term decision-making) than U.S.-style governance systems).
116 See supra Part II.A.1.
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willing to intervene in a timely fashion when it becomes known that
1 17
management decisions have turned out badly.
While proximate monitors such as large block-holders with representatives on boards of directors have superior and more timely access
to information than outside, objective monitors, they still have less
information than insiders such as CEOs. This gives the CEOs an advantage even over proximate boards in influencing corporate decision-making. This advantage is exacerbated by the fact that CEOs
have considerable, though waning, influence over the choice of who
serves on boards of directors. 118 As Becht, Bolton and R6ell have observed, "[e]ven when boards have achieved independence from management they are often not as effective as they could be because
directors prefer to play a less confrontational 'advisory' role than a
more critical monitoring role."'119 However, this problem is likely to
be less acute where large stakeholders such as banks sit on boards,
since they have such a significant financial stake in the corporation.
Formal economic analysis of the role of boards of directors
reveals that the effectiveness of boards of directors erodes gradually
over time. 120 However, on the plus side, the long run nature of relationships between the multiple constituencies in European and Japanese corporations is thought to promote human capital investment.
Similarly, the fiduciary rules in the U.S. are designed to promote
shareholder value, while the German rules are designed to balance
the interests of shareholders and employees.12 1
Thus, we given the continental European system of corporate
governance low marks for its ability to fill in gaps in contingent contracts, mediocre marks for its ability to resolve agency problems, and
good marks for its propensity to promote human capital investments.
In sum, notwithstanding the benefits afforded by the more proximate
monitoring that characterizes the European system (like the U.S. system), the European system may fail to adequately address subtle
agency problems.
3.

Corporate Governance in Italy

The Italian system of corporate governance is a virtual mirror image of the U.S. system; it receives low marks for its ability to fill gaps in
contingent contracts, due to its insufficient legal system and the absence of investor protection. 122 Italian corporate governance also per117

Id.

118

BECHT ET AL., supra note 115, at 41.

119
120

Id.

Id. at 43; see also Benjamin Hermalin & Michael Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen
Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of CEOs, 88 ECON. REv. 96 (1998).
121
BECHT ET AL., supra note 115, at 17.
122
Macey, supra note 1, at 129, 134.
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forms poorly in terms of its ability to resolve agency problems, 12 3 as
illustrated by the fact that the duty of loyalty does not operate in Italy. 124 This absence exists for several reasons, not the least of which is
that the Italian courts have no expertise or inclination to protect noncontrolling investors.1 25 Two features of the Italian corporate governance system-political involvement and small firms that finance
themselves internally' 26-substitute for the lack of market-based control systems that characterize U.S. corporate governance.
The State historically controlled the nation's banks and large
companies and has "constantly made up for failures in the governance
environment of private companies by providing them with a steady
flow of resources."' 27 This element of State control in the Italian corporate governance system is hardly salutary. The politicization of capital investment decisions inevitably results in sub-optimal decisions
about capital allocation. 28 In addition to State ownership, the Italian
corporate governance system is characterized by complicated cross
and pyramidal ownership structures. 129 This system of shareholdings
possibly entrenches management, disadvantages minority shareholders, prevents capital market discipline, and stifles the development of
a.corporate control market.13 0 However, these ownership structures
do result in the emergence of a clearly identified, highly stable controlling coalition. This control group has close ties to management
and timely access to any information, including confidential corporate
information, that it desires. Thus, the control group has a highly textured involvement that includes the ability to make instantaneous
changes whenever necessary. The complicated and pyramidal ownership structures do, however, distort and confuse incentives. 13 1 Also,
such investor proximity to management leads to joint responsibility
(by implication) and a lack of objectivity that weakens the investors
monitoring role. 132 Further, legal protection for shareholders in Italy
is so insufficient that external financing is barely feasible for investors
133
who do not receive control rights.
The U.S. corporate governance system is flawed because takeovers are so expensive that it is only cost-effective to address large123
124
125

See id. at 135-37.
See id. at 140.
See ROBERTO WEIGMANN,

RESPONSABILITA'

TRATORI 104-13 (1974); Barca, supra note 27;
126
See Macey, supra note 1, at 138, 143.
127

128
129

130
131
132
133

Barca, supra note 27.
See Macey, supra note 1, at 138.
See id. at 136.
See id.
See id.
See supra Part II.
See Macey, supra note 1, at 129-35.
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Macey, supra note 1, at 134-35.
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scale managerial failures. In contrast, the controlling shareholders
managing the Italian corporate governance system are able to make
changes at a much lower cost because they are already in control.
However, because of their personal involvement with management
and their involvement in complicated ownership structures, these controlling investors are likely to lack the objectivity necessary to make
the difficult decisions required to control agents' behavior.
As noted previously, the Italian economy has not suffered as a
result of the failings of the Italian corporate governance system. The
success of the Italian economy is due, in large part, to the fact that the
country has a disproportionately large number of small firms that perform exceedingly well. 134 An astonishing 98% of Italian firms employ
fewer than twenty workers. 13 5 These firms solve corporate governance
problems in the simplest way possible: they lack the separation between ownership and management that generates agency problems in
more complex systems. Thus, "[c]orporate governance [does not]
matter very much in Italy because there are so few large and medium
sized firms."'1 3 6 Complex solutions to corporate governance problems
are not necessary in these small firms because they are financed and
managed by individual entrepreneurs and their families, who already
have both the incentives and the ability to monitor and control their
firmn.137

The rigid, inflexible industrial structure of the Italian corporate
governance system creates strong incentives for managers to make
firm-specific human capital investments. 138 This is true in small Italian firms because these firms are "often staffed with family members
or close friends of the owner, [who] can make credible, long-term
commitments to employees that, in turn, provide the employees with
incentives to make such firm-specific capital investments.'

39

In Italy,

even relatively large firms are influenced by family groups. For example, Francesca Visintin reports that almost 40% of businesses with less
40
than 200 employees are controlled by families.'
See id.at 141-43.
See id. at 141.
136
See id. at 140. See also MarkJ. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233
(2002) (discussing the meaning and effect of degrees of separation of ownership and control in various nations, including Italy). Roe argues that a nation's corporate law, even if
"perfect" cannot fully contain managerial agency costs; thus, ownership structure may have
to take this into account. See Roe, supra, at 233.
137
Macey, supra note 1, at 142.
134

135

1318

See id. at 142.

139

Barca, supra note 27, at 7.
See FRANCESCA VISINTIN, CORPORATE

140

GOVERNANCE AND PRODUCT INNOVATION: AN AT-

9-10 (UniversitA degli
Studi di Udine Dipartimento di Scienze Echonomiche, Working Paper No. MOS. 03-01,
Nov. 2002).
TEMPTED EXPLANATION OF THE ITALIAN INDUSTRIAL SPECIALISATION
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In essence, the Italian system of corporate governance does not
compare favorably with the U.S. system in terms of its ability to protect
minority investments, fill gaps in contingent contracts, or reduce
agency costs. Therefore, it is not surprising that Italy has weak capital
markets and virtually no venture capital. However, Italy has flourished
because investors and entrepreneurs innovate around the system's deficiencies and utilize the closely held corporation form. 14 1 These
small, often family-centered businesses obviate the need for mechanisms that reduce agency cost problems by eliminating the agency relationship altogether. Although it is often overlooked, this system
provides strong incentives for managers to make the firm-specific
human capital investments necessary to develop specialized skills.142
Managers within these intimate firms can make investments with the
knowledge that they will not be exploited. Italy's innovations illustrate
how adaptability fosters successful corporate governance, notwithstanding the lack of an objective corporate governance system.
IV
FINAL OBSERVATIONS

The core problem in developed corporate governance systems is
the inevitable tradeoff between proximity and objectivity among
monitors of corporate agents. Both objectivity and proximity have distinct costs and benefits. Objectivity-based corporate governance systems result in distance, potentially less information, and less timely
intervention in management's decisions. Proximity-based corporate
governance systems are more informative and provide more timely intervention, facilitating not only prompt, but preemptive corrective
action.
Ideally, governance arrangements should be tailored to fit the desired governance needs of a particular firm or industry. In some firms
or industries the disadvantages of proximity might dominate, while in
others the lack of information because of distance and objectivity
might be prohibitively costly. For example, the irreversibility of investments is a potentially important determinant of the need for proximity, rather than objectivity. 143 Issues of adaptability play a role in this
determination as well. For example, stricter disclosure requirements
may overcome some information shortages and may facilitate more
distance, both of which would lead to increased objectivity. Since
See id. at 140-43.
Macey, supra note 1, at 142.
143 This suggests that offering a choice among different charters orjurisdictions could
enhance value because, ideally, corporate governance arrangements should be tailored to
a particular industry. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & ALMA COHEN, FiRms' DECISIONS WHERE TO
INCORPORATE (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9107, 2002).
141
142
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practical legal constraints currently impede such industry-specific
choices, however, many nations will need to take significant steps to
facilitate this superior means of constructing corporate governance
systems. Indeed, while uniform, nationwide corporate governance decisions doubtless provide predictability and ease of application, this
Article suggests that greater benefits could be garnered via industryspecific governance decisions.
Observed nation-wide corporate governance arrangements-be
they proximate or objective-do not deal satisfactorily with subtle
agency problems, either because of lack of information, as in the objective U.S. system, or capture, as in the intrusive continental European system. The U.S. model is superior with regard to contingent
contract gap filling, and thus has lower contracting costs, but it is inferior in generating high quality information and in protecting
human capital and relationship-specific investments.' 44 The continental European model provides less satisfactory solutions to contingent contract gap filling, but generates high quality information and
is superior in protecting specific human capital investments. 145 The
latter holds particularly true in a malfunctioning corporate govern146
ance system, i.e., the Italian system.
In closing, while this Article emphasized the adaptability and resilience of different arrangements, it seems that corporate governance
systems are converging along certain specific dimensions.1 47 In continental Europe, where ownership stakes have traditionally concentrated, substantial pressure has recently come about to improve the
liquidity of stock markets. The ownership of shares of the general
public has grown substantially and this growth has led to increased
dispersion. In the United States, we observe more concentration and
increased institutional investor involvement. Observing the U.S. and
continental European trends, convergence of stock ownership patterns seems underway, as concentrated and dispersed ownership
meet. Corporate governance systems also seem to be converging in
144
Observe that the contracting environment in an objective system like that of the
U.S. depends on enforceable contracts. In a proximity-based system, the legal regime
could possibly allow contracting parties more discretion because the parties are close and
could immediately respond to gaps.
145
See supra Part III.B.2.
146
See id. Observe that in Italy, as we have discussed, existing solutions to the problem

of contingent contracts are totally inadequate. Moreover, Italy addresses subtle agency
problems poorly.
147
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or
Function, 49 AM. J. COMp. L. 329 (2001) (discussing the recent shift toward convergence
and hypothesizing on reasons for this shift); cf Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A
Theory of Path Dependence in-Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAmN.
L. REV. 127 (1999)
(discussing structural and rule-driven forces that induce path dependence and delay
convergence).
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other ways. Boards of directors in two-tier systems and nonexecutive
directors income tier systems have become more and more accountable to shareholders, which has required both groups to divorce themselves from management. Cozy arrangements between directors and
management have thus become less acceptable.
Nonetheless, as corporate governance systems continue to converge, it is increasingly important to consider the impact of the tradeoff between objectivity and proximity and of the role of adaptability in
shaping optimal corporate governance systems. Indeed, the above
analysis makes clear that the tradeoff exists, that adaptability plays
something of a mitigating factor, and that most nations maintain systems which feature either objectivity, or proximity, but not both.
Thus, nations should seriously consider the potential value of combining these considerations with a move toward industry-specific governance structures.
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